
































































The eco-label is a new environmental 
instrument widely used by many countries.  
Its purpose is to help consumer to identify 
if the product satisfies the environmental 
standards on production or consumption.  
In order to obtain an eco-label, the firm has 
to input efforts to control pollution, revise 
product design, and adjust production 
process. 
Most of the existing economic 
literature is empirical work, focusing on the 
effects of eco-labels on consumption.  The 
theoretical papers argue whether or not 
eco-labels can improve environmental 
quality.  Moreover, most of the articles 
follow closed-economy framework, 
neglecting the trade effects of eco-labels 
and the relation to other instruments.  
However, under negotiations on 
international trade and environmental 
agreements, many countries concern if 
eco-labels constitute barriers to trade and 
their trade effects.  This issue is also very 
important to Taiwan, which has a high trade 
reliance rate.  Therefore, it is very 
necessary to extend the analysis of 
eco-labels to the open-economy framework. 
This paper is one of the first attempts 
to analyse eco-labels in the open-economy 
framework.  Most of the existing literature 
uses incomplete information and closed 
economy models in order to analyse the 
effects of eco-labels.  Instead, this study 
uses product differentiation and trade 
models. 
In presence of product differentiation, 
a firm without eco-labelling can still 
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engages in environmental dumping with a 
low product price.  Asymmetric 
eco-labelling decisions bring product 
differentiation, making profits of firms with 
and without eco-labels both increase. 
As shown in our model, product 
differentiation increases a firm’s profit.  
Even if the consumer’s environmental 
consciousness is strong in the importing 
country, the Nash equilibrium eco-labelling 
decisions can still be asymmetric.  That is, 
both firms can still increase their profits 
through asymmetric eco-labelling decision.  
In this case, at least some firms will still 
export goods with high pollution in 
consumption to the home country.  If the 
consumer’s environmental consciousness is 
weak in the importing country, it is very 
possible that no firm eco-labels its product 
at Nash equilibrium.  As a result, the 
pollution in consumption can be maximised.  
The case in which the importing country 
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Swallow and Sedjo (2000) 則放寬 
































































































































P = a  b(q1 + q2)， 
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P = A  b(q1 + q2)， 
其中 A > a > 0, b > 0, A > c + t。需求曲線
截距項A > a，代表環保標章具有提高消費
者願付價格的效果（Kou, Hu and Hwang 
2001; Stevens, Ahmad, Ruddell 1998; 
Wessels, Kline and Anderson 1996; Wessels, 
Johnston and Donath 1999）。換言之，環保
標章具有提高消費者願付價格的效果。 




Pi = A  bqi + bqj， 
Pj = a  bqi + bqj， 
i = 1, 2, i  j。參數為產品差異化係數，0 




and Saggi (2002)、胡均立與朱維愷 











 i(q1, q2) = [A  b(q1 + q2)  c  t] qi， 
i = 1, 2。 
聯立求解兩個廠商的利潤極大化問題，可
得出Cournot競爭均衡產量為 


















































 i(q1, q2) = 
 [a  b(q1 + q2)  c  t] qi  K， 
i = 1, 2。 
聯立求解兩個廠商的利潤極大化問題，可
得出Cournot競爭均衡產量為 


















































 1(q1, q2) =  
(A  bq1 + bq2  c  t)q1， 
2q
Max
 2(q1, q2) =  
(a  bq2 + bq1  c t)q2。 
聯立求解兩個廠商的利潤極大化問題，可






















，其中q1III > q2III。 
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1\ 2 NL EL 
NL 1I, 2I 1IV, 2IV 













大），則1II > 1I且2II > 2I。根據以上討
論，在一般化的產品差異性設定下，此時 
1IV > 1I及2III > 2I必定成立。故在策略
組合點 (NL, NL) 上，雙方皆有偏離之誘
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